From a "formalistic" point of view the Regions are and have been neglected (especially in the past) in the EU law context.
Goals of the paper: a constitutional language for the cohesion policies
The goal of this paper is to expand some of the traditional concepts of constitutionalism in a twofold direction: first of all, it will be necessary to verify the utility of classic concepts of constitutionalism in order to analyze contemporary institutions. Then, secondly, it will be necessary to 'apply' the constitutionalist perspective to the area of the cohesion policies. As Leonardi has pointed out 2 , in fact, the literature on cohesion has been enriched above all by economists and by scholars in public policies and international relations.
The mentioned author has never even quoted legal scholars. What will be attempted here, after having traced back the Community process to the paradigm of the 'federalizing processes', is to evaluate the impact of social policies (and cohesion policies are to be included here as well) on the form of the Union. This formulation (calling up concepts such as form of State, so dear to constitutionalists) is intended to designate relations between various levels of government (national, regional and supranational); all this stemming from a This endeavor is made difficult, in the case of constitutionalists, by the fact that, historically, in Europe (and even more so in Italy), with a few celebrated exceptions, constitutionalists have not, followed with due consideration the evolution of the Community legal order from its very first steps. I will try to fill this gap through the comparative method by looking at other constitutional This shows the interlaced nature of the system between the levels and their mutual implications. By overcoming the dualism between monism and dualism Palermo uses the notion of integrated form of State (that is the whole of fundamental principles of a legal order).
The constitutional law of integration would be similar to the common law, founding itself on a legal order which pre-exists to the State, on a wide production at regulative level, and on the adjudicative activity of a jurisdictional system which is above all remedial. 14 Palermo's intuitions represent a starting point because they insist on the "complex" nature of the European Union.
As a matter of fact, the EU, like all the other complex systems, is characterized by such features: non-reducibility, unpredictability, non-determinism, nonreversibility. It is suggested here that the notion of complexity can offer a very important contribution (in terms of dynamism) to the multilevel constitutionalism theory. The bridge of this interlaced (from the original meaning of the term complex) system is provided by the constant exchanges among levels. By the formula constitutional synallagma it is to be understood the whole of flows, practises and rules which circulate from one level to another in a twofold direction (from top to bottom and viceversa) enriching in a mutual way the European Constitution which is a chameleonic and neverending process of constitutional coordination. The bridge linking the levels is represented by art. 234 ECT: thanks to this provision the ECJ cooperates with the judges producing its interpretative sentences. The latter are typical examples of cultural sources of law which give new blood to the constitutional synallagma.
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This complexity reveals the interlaced nature of the Form of Union and impliesat the same time-the irreducibility of the EU to one of the legal tradition of its components as I tried to point out above. A focus on the other side of this notion is also to be valued, that is to say the relationship between the centre and the periphery in the multilevel context in order to describe the impact of the cohesion policies on the multilevel constitutionalism and governance focusing on the subnational level: precisely the regional one.
The possibility of a supranational Welfare
Is a supranational welfare possible in a context without an axiological homogeneity?
This question was analyzed in multicultural contexts such as that of Canada by Banting and Kymlicka.
In their study they demonstrate the non exclusive relationship between solidarity and cultural homogeneity. and replacing it with "territorial".
Nevertheless, distinguished scholarship on this issue favors a reading for which a systematic corroboration of Article 16 TEC and Article 3 would be necessary.
In this sense it is interesting to stress the choice expressed in the TreatyConstitution where the word constantly accompanies the notion of economic and social development: eg., art. I-14 which provides that the policies regarding economic, social and territorial cohesion fall within the shared competences areas. Another example is provided by art. III-416 which identifies a limit to the actions of reinforced cooperation in the economic, social and territorial cohesion (together with common market).
Nevertheless, however undeniable the still market-friendly spirit present in the Treaty, one ought to point out is the presence of some collaborative clauses between the reasons of the market and those of the welfare.
One also needs to mention here the provisions of Article 136.2, c, where a functional common market is seen as a prerequisite for the harmonization of welfare systems. Free market and welfare objectives are therefore joined together, without viewing the former as an "obstacle" for the realization of general welfare objectives.
To overcome the presumed weaknesses of the European social dimension, it is necessary to complete the framework by including in this EU Social model the cohesion policies as well.
In the EC Treaty an entire Title (XVII) is devoted to social and economic cohesion and in article 158 one can find a definition of economic and social cohesion being understood as instrumental for the aim of pursuing the "overall This approach is questionable because it tends to isolate the question from other connected issues: the weakness of the European parties, the composition of the other European institutions, the restrictions to the access to the ECJ for actors such as the Regions, the perennial violation of the principles of conferral and subsidiarity and the lack of a clear system of legal sources.
As one can easily infer, several of these issues are strongly interrelated: for example the problem of the violation of subsidiarity is linked to that of the lack of direct access for the Regions before the ECJ.
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In this part of the paper I will try to connect the role given to the Regions by the cohesion policies with respect to some of these democratic issues.
As a preliminary stage it ought to be said that it is possible to link cohesion policies with both negative and positive effects on the democratic deficit.
The possibilities offered by cohesion policies
Traditionally the history of the EC have been ungenerous towards the subnational entities but more recently something new has happened thanks to a progressive improvement of the Regions in the EU context.
The cohesion policies, in fact, make regions very important actors in the economic dynamics of EU and this could contribute to the overcoming of
Landesblindheit.
This is the first proof of the impact of social policies on the Form of Union could be the revaluation of regions usually neglected in the legal dynamics of Europe. 
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Regions finds its confirmation in the wording of the Treaties (specifically in
Article 10, TEC), where it is noted that the subjects of the Community legal order are the states, holders of the duty to collaborate with each other, which is instrumental for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the supranational law.
Nevertheless, the ECJ has partially reconsidered its own position following the increase in importance of decentralization processes within domestic systems.
The Konle case, concerning a disagreement between a citizen and the Austrian administration, was the outcome of a preliminary ruling ex 234 TEC.
The Court also added that: "subject to that reservation, Community law does not require Member States to make any change in the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the public bodies which exist on their territory".
The only condition imposed by the Community judge was that "the procedural arrangements in the domestic system enable the rights which individuals derive from the Community legal system to be effectively protected and it is not more difficult to assert those rights than the rights which they derive from the domestic legal system". In its reasoning, the ECJ admitted that "in Member
States 
under the conditions laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 in actions brought by the
Court of Auditors, by the European Central Bank and by the Committee of the
Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives". It is difficult to understand the weight of the cohesion factor on this development but it is interesting to recall the economic profile of the EC evolution. What is meant here is that in the history of the EC the legal label has always come after the economic change. In this sense one could infer that the improvement of the legal status of the Regions is a consequence of their economic weight in the life of the Union. There are two main difficulties in this reasoning: first of all, the terminological issue as it is unclear that economists and lawyers mean the same thing with the term "Region" or "subsidiarity". The problem is the lack of activism of the ECJ in this ambit: this element does not allow us to compare with the American experience the impact of welfare on the relation between the centre and periphery.
As many scholars (see the researches and the projects of the NewGov project)
have pointed out, the work of the structural funds is, in fact, based on a curious mix between new and old techniques of governance. The aim of the European cohesion policies was rather to create a system of multilevel governance that would have included at least three levels: Community, Member States and regions, with the possibility for the latter to involve the local level, further inserted into the cohesion policies as a genuine forth level. Private actors, stimulated to invest by structural interventions, can produce a sort of multiplication effort that has an impact on the private sector, setting in motion a cycle of endogenous development that includes production innovation and generates employment in underdeveloped areas. The virtuous circle mentioned would be, nevertheless, unimaginable without a programming activity acting as a framework for structural intervention. As Leonardi All this confirms the schizophrenic nature of the system: the Committee has an important role but it is not an effective representative body of the actors who should be represented.
The term "Region" or "regionalism" are used in several contexts: regional community, regional society, region-state, regional complex. Nevertheless, it must be said that a very interesting process is touching the new candidates States and the new member States: it is possible to note a progressive process of adaptation of the internal territorial configuration of the legal order to the criteria used by the NUTS to identify the Regions. In conclusion, one can generally say that the cohesion policies contribute to improve the regional dimension of the European Union with an evidently positive outcome to counter the democratic deficit. At the same time, the mechanism of such policies undeniably contributes to improving the technocratic side at the regional level spreading one of the most important virus of the democratic deficit of the supranational level.
Another factor which should be stressed is the lack of sufficient transparency and accountability in the cohesion policies procedures , which is a negative side of the partnership and the involvement of several actors and of the softness of the instruments used This shift in the legal reasoning of the ECJ has, however, a negative side because it contributes to increase the discretion of the judgements, to decrease its controllability and to change the nature of the ECJ approach which is traditionally more oriented to the pragmatism required by an economic law such as that of EU law .
Another problem linked to the spreading of soft law is the less important role played by the classic and institutional actors (first of all the European Parliament), contributing to the affection of the institutional balance: the risk is Within this context a very important role could be played by subsidiarity but this point requires a preliminary linguistic remark.
By looking at the language used by the documents concerning the structural funds, it seems useful to remark that the subsidiarity principle seems to be limited to its "negative" aspect: the preference conferred upon the subject closest to the citizenship.
At an economic level, it has been said that "the principle of subsidiarity means that the production of public goods should be attributed to the level of government that has jurisdiction over the area in which that good is public"
.
Starting from this definition that seems to neglect the 'activist' side of the principle (that is the one postulating the intervention of the central level for the realization of the mentioned conditions), we can appreciate the remark made with regard to additionality and to a partnership that implies the collaboration among the European, national and regional administrations.
The subsidiarity principle, due to its physiology, requires a system of competences at least tending towards a repartition and at the same time supposes, as was pointed out, an "integrated" system like, for example, a federal system of the cooperative type. This would explain why, within the Community context, subsidiarity has operated as an "accelerator of centripetal forces" (Baldassarre) rather than as a factor of valorization of the de-centered realities, in the absence of a formal catalogue of competences. Subsidiarity and competence are not, nevertheless, in a relationship of identity: in fact it has been said that the principle of subsidiarity is not intended so much for the formal allocation of a priori competences, but rather for the a posteriori legitimation of the exercise of competences beyond those formally attributed. 49 Subsidiarity has successfully operated in a context such as the German one, which does not define competences in the finalistic manner 50 (as opposed to the French model) of the TEC. This worrying mingling of legal styles explains the destabilization factor that could be introduced by the subsidiarity principle. This is mainly because of its "surreptitious" substitution of the flexibility clause that has allowed the Union (and before, the Community) to acquire 'slices of competence' transversally instrumental for the realization of the enounced objectives, without the procedural guarantee of unanimity. The Court involved in the justiciability of such a principle will be forced to verify the necessity of higher level substitution by carrying out a costs/benefits test.
The only way to limit the discretion of the judge seems to pose procedural guarantees such as those proposed by the Convention for the Constitutional Treaty and contained in the "Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality".
As a result a form of political monitoring called "early warning mechanism" was provided in that Protocol.
According to it the Commission should transmit a draft legislative act to the national parliaments, giving them six weeks to determine if there is a violation of subsidiarity. If one third of the parliaments decide there is a violation, the Commission is required to reconsider the proposal.
Obviously the proposal of the Convention does not exhaust the possible solutions in order to guarantee the role of regional actors at European level.
Probably the contribution of the constitutional lawyer could consist of the attempt to furnish institutional and legal techniques in order to rationalize the system and to solve the paradox of the flexible criteria: they are both a resource and a threat for the European legal order.
In this sense it seems useful to recall the solutions suggested by the Italian Constitutional Court 54 : subsidiarity requires a fair cooperation ("leale collaborazione") between the territorial actors, concertative practices and bodies and, finally, a system of agreements among the institutional actors.
Despite the clarity of such a judgement, the real problem is to apply and enforce such principles and many solutions were proposed: the creation of new 
